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ABSTRACT
Provincial governments in Canada are fundamental actors in redefining climate
change strategies for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) regionally in North
America. The government of Ontario has shown the capacity for adapting and
creating government machinery to build relations with other provinces and U.S.
states. Its aim has been to articulate local interests to respond to global environ-
mental pressures that demand short-term solutions. The main instruments used
to contain GHGs for Ontario have been voluntary market mechanisms like cap and
trade, the regional integration of energy and transport sectors, and enforcing the
lawwithin the province. This article presents Ontario’s climate strategies and sug-
gests that they can be analyzed using the concept of trans-bioeconomic regions.
Key words: cap and trade, climate change, greenhouse gases, energy, Kyoto Protocol, trans-
bioeconomic region
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INTRODUCTION
Provincial governments in Canada can become fundamental actors in redefining
North American climate change strategies for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG).
Looking back at the history and achievements of Canadian climate policies, results
favor some provincial trends in terms of performance, enforcing the law, and scope,
leaving the federal government –whether Liberal or Conservative– behind.
While climate change has been one of the environmental issues under discus-
sion since the 1970s, the earlier focus was on issues like acid rain, toxic waste, and
the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
drafted in 1987, dealt with the “hot topic” of the time and “signaled that environ-
mental issues were increasingly moving from the local and national to the global
level” (Paehlke, 2008: 58).
Climate change was placed on the national agenda one year later. In 1988, the
Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security international conference
took place in Toronto, just after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) was established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United
Nations Environment Program (Bramley, 2000: 1-2). This conference was a prece-
dent for establishing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in December 1992, in which Canada and 160 other countries par-
ticipated. After several UNFCCC meetings, at the end of the 1997 meeting in Japan, a
protocol to operate the framework was drafted, the Kyoto Protocol (KP). It was
signed by Canada’s Liberal government April 29, 1998, with a commitment to reduce
GHG 6 percent, taking 1990 as a baseline year; this goal had to be met by the period
2008-2012 (Environment Canada, 2008).
However, the road to negotiation and ratification of the protocol was difficult
for the country. Before signing it, “Canada was focused exclusively on the U.S. posi-
tion. Canadian negotiators were directed by the two federal ministers leading the
delegation to stay 1 percent behind the U.S. Canada was cognizant of the need to
remain economically competitive with its largest trading partner” (Harrison, 2007:
103). By that time, the U.S. had set a goal of 3 percent GHG reduction. In this sense,
the Canadian government established a national climate-change process to consult
with its constituency and other stakeholders, including the provincial and territori-
al governments. This process set the Canadian government position at a 2 percent
reduction (Climate Change Resource Center, 2008; Harrison, 2007: 106).
Nonetheless, the U.S. government suddenly raised the goal to a 7 percent GHG
reduction due to internal social and political pressures –especially Al Gore’s envi-
ronmental campaign and nomination as Democratic Party presidential candidate.
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The Canadian government then raised its own commitment to 6 percent, changing
its position at the last minute before signing the protocol. The response of some
provinces was between ambiguous and negative (Stillborn, 2002: 5; Smith, 1998: 10-
11). Some disagreed strongly and argued that it was not what consensus or previ-
ous programs had established. Alberta, for example, disagreed with the percentage,
others in the way it was done, like Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and others, like
Quebec, adopted Kyoto but fought for decision-making autonomy. It was Ontario
and British Columbia who welcomed the federal commitments and started fighting
for environmental leadership (Smith, 1998: 12).
However, a change in the context made countries that had already signed the
KP –or were about to– lose their balance. Elections took place in the U.S. giving the
presidency to the Republican Party led by George W. Bush. In spring 2001, Pres-
ident George W. Bush announced that the U.S. would not ratify the KP. By then, the
Canadian federal government was already locked into the agreement because it
had been one of its promoters, along with Japan, the European Union and, ironi-
cally, the U.S. Canada was stuck with a very high commitment and with criticism
inside the country. The Canadian federal government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in
December 2002 hoping that the international inertia of the Johannesburg 2002
Conference on Environment and Development would convince provinces to imple-
ment the KP.1 However, ratification had no support in eight out of ten provinces,
among the business community, and especially from Ontario; only Quebec and
Manitoba were in favor (Harrison, 2007: 107). Canada’s main economic partner had
left the agreement, leaving Canadians with low rates of competitiveness –especial-
ly for local economies integrated regionally with the U.S and that used fossil fuels
to produce energy. The only way out for the Canadian federal government was to
fight for exceptions and privileges at the following meetings of the KP process.
The general reaction of the provinces was that most ignored the KP. Taking its
own path, the government of Ontario has been developing strategies and creating
governing machinery to build relations with other provinces and some U.S. states
for responding to climate change. The main instruments Ontario has used to con-
tain GHGs have been voluntary market mechanisms like cap and trade, the integra-
tion of energy and transport sectors on a regional basis, and enforcement of the law
within the province.
The objective of this article is to present Ontario’s climate-change strategies
and to suggest that they can be analyzed using the concept of trans-bioeconomic
regions. In the first part, I will draft a brief note about the jurisdiction and compe-
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1 In Canada, some international agreements can be ratified directly by the prime minister.
106
MARCELA LÓPEZ-VALLEJO OLVERA
NORTEAMÉRICA
tence over natural resources and the issue of climate change in Canada. The second
part will deal with Ontario’s political and legislative strategies on climate change.
In the third part, I will develop the concept of trans-bioeconomic regions and ana-
lyze some of Ontario’s most important actions using this approach. In this section,
I will also present the main instruments used by the province to contain GHGs, that
is, voluntary market mechanisms such as cap and trade, the regional integration of
sectors, and enforcement of the law within the province. I will conclude presenting
the practical and theoretical limits of this new form of conceiving and constructing
a region, as well as the challenges and opportunities Ontario’s policy paths present
within the current regional context.
JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCE
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN CANADA
Canada intensely debated the jurisdiction over natural resources since the nine-
teenth century. Protection of the environment was not specified as a power of the
legislature in the Constitution Act of 1867 (Juillet, 2005: 106-7), so legislative jurisdic-
tion must be found in the existing division of powers. The British North American
Act –the Canadian Constitution of 1867– specified in Section 109 that provincial
governments had jurisdiction over their lands and natural resources. Sections 92(5)
and 92(13) confirmed the exclusivity of the rights the provinces had over land sales
and resources –except fishery resources, which were under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal government (Howlett, 2000: 114). The most crucial claim to leg-
islative jurisdiction over environmental management at the federal level fell under
the federal parliament’s power to make laws regarding all matters not assigned
exclusively to the provinces. In addition, Parliament has legislative jurisdiction in
the areas relevant to environmental policy, such as maritime and inland fishery
resources, navigation, and shipping or taxation (MacKay, 2004: 2).
Tracing back the origins of environmental policy in Canada, its foundations
date to federal-provincial disputes over the management and control of Canada’s
land and resources in the early years of Confederation (Howlett, 2000: 531). Yet, as
Luc Juillet claims (2005), due to the lack of a clear reference in the Constitution Act
of 1867, nowadays both levels of government –federal and provincial– have to jus-
tify the legitimacy of their intervention into environmental issues by referring to
specific powers over other related fields. Provinces have claimed their right to juris-
diction over taxation, agriculture, and administration of natural resources, and this
right is the key for environmental policy design: “Canadian provinces own pub-
licly-held resources within their borders. With some 90 percent of Canada’s land mass
still in public hands, the provinces thus control the natural resources most relevant
to climate policy: oil, gas, and coal on the one hand, and forest sinks and hydroelec-
tric potential on the other” (Harrison, 2007: 97).
The federal government for its part would claim its jurisdiction over fishery
resources, navigation, criminal law, federal land, fiscal issues, international treaties,
and matters of “peace, order, and good government” (MacKay, 2004: 3). For exam-
ple, provinces can levy taxes on natural resources during the extraction process;
the rest of the taxes have to be divided by both levels of government –leading nec-
essarily to negotiation. But most important is the provinces’ right to implement or
not any international treaty; this is one of the main reasons why provincial coop-
eration is indeed necessary for developing environmental treaties in Canada.
However, the federal government has used its “declaratory power” (Section 92[10c])
to gain complete control of some resources at strategic moments such as during
World War II.
Thus, the environmental legislative sphere overlaps many areas of exclusive
federal and provincial constitutional jurisdictions. Both levels of government also
overlap and concur in certain jurisdictional and competency areas. The ambiguous
nature of legislative jurisdiction in Canada has caused the federal government and
the provinces to enter into several hundred federal-provincial agreements on the
environment, informal arrangements, and court cases (MacKay, 2004). As Kathryn
Harrison states, “In Canada, the courts have granted presumptive regulatory author-
ity under the ‘property and civil rights’ clause to the provinces, which thus exercise
greater autonomy in Canadian environmental policy” (2007: 97). In the end, this
ambiguity about jurisdiction and competence regarding environmental affairs ben-
efits the provincial design of environmental local policies, and poses them as an
exceptional voice for influencing the national ones.
ONTARIO’S CLIMATE ACTION PLANS
Several Canadian provinces drafted climate action plans during the first years of this
new century; British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan are
the most important since they are also the biggest polluters (see table 1). Each of
them was based on a “common but differentiated” approach where each province
established specific commitments in specific time frames based on its kind of eco-
nomic activity. For all provinces, the main source of emissions was energy con-
sumption, which accounted for 80.9 percent of GHG emissions in 2008; and, in the
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province of Ontario, automakers, manufacturing, and energy production sectors are
still the most polluting (Environment Canada, 2008: 37-43; 532-533).
Impacts and Responses
Ontario, like all regions in Canada –and probably the world– is vulnerable to cli-
mate change. The impacts are being felt already in the ecological regions of the
province (map 1). In the last decade, the province had experienced extreme weath-
er, flooding, water shortages, lower water levels in the Great Lakes, forest fires,
reduced agricultural production, damages to infrastructure and property, and out-
breaks of water-borne diseases (Chiotti and Lavender, 2008: 229). These situations
affect citizens’ health, infrastructure, productivity, and resources, and particularly
lead to scarcity of fishery resources and the loss of polar biodiversity.
In response to these impacts and local needs, since 2005 the Ontario govern-
ment has taken actions such as reducing coal-plant emissions by one-third, pro-
tecting 1.8 million acres through the Golden Horseshoe Greenbelt Plan, and trying
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to save energy by using alternative fuels (Ministry of MunicipalAffairs andHousing,
2009; Office of the Premier NR, 2007a). Also in 2005, the government of Ontario par-
ticipated in the first Shared Air Summit. This conference brought together govern-
ment, corporations, scientists, and non-governmental leaders from Canada and the
United States to discuss strategies to reduce trans-boundary air pollution, smog,
and climate change. As a consequence of its participation, Ontario established
new standards for 40 air pollutants and tougher regulations and limits for the
largest industrial sources of smog emissions (Office of the Premier, NR, 2007a). Since
then, the Ontario government has been very active in moving climate policies
toward a more comprehensive approach. During 2005 and 2006, it established sev-
eral programs to save electricity in social housing services, new and more efficient
domestic appliance distribution, credits for own-energy providers or alternative
energy suppliers and customers, as well as 690 wind turbines, and support for the
hybrid car industry and consumers (Office of the Premier, NR, 2007a). In fact, by
2006, Ontario became the national leader in the construction of wind facilities for
producing energy (Environment Canada, 2008: 533). As a result of its participation
the following year in the 2006 Second Shared Air Summit, Ontario signed one
agreement with Quebec and another with the northeastern U.S. states to reduce
trans-boundary air pollution.
In this context, the provincial government drafted the Energy Conservation
Responsibility Act in March 2006, with the purpose of requiring “ministries, agen-
cies, and broader public sector organizations...to prepare energy conservation plans
on a regular basis, and report on energy consumption, proposed conservation mea-
sures, and progress,” (Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, 2006), as well as
installing smart meters (meters that can record and report electricity consumption
information automatically) in residences and small businesses in a first stage due to
be completed in 2010. This was combined with a pricing system for energy conser-
vation and saving. That same year, Ontario’s minister of energy and infrastructure
amended the Energy Efficiency Act of 1992 to include new, higher standards in ener-
gy-using products (Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, 2006). With these two
laws, Ontario’s government was dealing with small-scale electricity consumption;
but the limits to industrial polluters, dealt with in the Shared Air Summit, were not
enough to cut GHG emissions as expected. The Ontario government needed to deal
with big polluters, such as the energy production industries.
The first move to cut big polluters’ emissions was to deal with the coal industry.
From 2003 to 2006, the Ontario government had been cutting emissions allowed from
coal plants by almost a third, and implementing regulations requiring that coal not
be used to generate electricity in certain areas of the province –inNanticoke,Atikokan,
109
CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES OF ONTARIO
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
110
MARCELA LÓPEZ-VALLEJO OLVERA
NORTEAMÉRICA
Lambton and Thunder Bay– after December 31, 2014 (Ministry of Environment,
2009a: 40). However, almost the same amount of electrical energy is still being
produced using coal in the country. The explanation is simple: “Ontario outsources
energy based on coal generation elsewhere (importing coal-based energy from the
U.S.)” (Burda and Peters, 2008: 10), simply transferring GHG coal-emissions to its
neighbor.
So, these energy policies were failing to reduce GHG emissions. Since 1990, Ontar-
io had constantly been the second most polluting province after Alberta with
almost 200 megatons (Mt) accumulated by 2006 (table 1) and had increased its GHG
emissions since 1990 by almost 10 percent. It was not until 2007 that the govern-
ment of Ontario launched its Go Green: Ontario’s Action Plan on Climate Change
with the goal of dealing with the province’s GHG emissions and energy demands,
specifically electricity. The main sources of electricity in the province have been
coal, hydro, natural gas, but nuclear power is the most important (Environment
Canada, 2008: 491-496). The plan included a strategy to lower GHG emissions by
1) efficient transportation, 2) de-carbonization of the economy, 3) development of
green power and alternative fuels, 4) restoration of forests, 5) green agriculture,
6) sustainable cities and towns, 7) greening industry, and 8) creating green jobs
(Government of Ontario, 2007). These priorities set by Liberal Premier Dalton
McGuinty attempted to establish an integrated plan for reducing GHG 6 per-
cent below 1990 levels by 2014 (61Mt), 15 percent by 2020 (99Mt), and 80 percent
by 2050 (Government of Ontario, 2007): these are almost the same as the goals
established by the Canadian federal government in the Kyoto Protocol.
To achieve its 2014 targets, the government [of Ontario] will finish the job of closing
down Ontario’s coal plants and carry out its existing policies, which would account for
more than 50 percent of all targets. About 15 percent will come from transit investments
and working on initiatives with the federal government and other partners, including
strong, national fuel-efficiency and auto emissions standards. Some 15 percent will result
from other policies, including home audits and incentives for municipalities to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions. (Office of the Premier, NR, 2007b)
Ontario’s Go Green Plan was now integrating big polluting sectors such as
energy production, automakers, transportation, and manufacturing, and focusing
on fuel efficiency with the former coal industry adjustment. To effect this energy
reconversion and GHG emissions reduction, linkages and negotiations with business
groups took place. In 2005, the auto industry, through the Canadian Vehicle Man-
ufacturers’ Association and the Association of International Automobile Manu-
facturers of Canada, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for taking actions to
voluntarily reduce new vehicles’ GHG emissions in Canada so that by 2010, annual
emissions reductions would reach 5.3Mt (Natural Resources Canada, 2005). The
plan’s vehicle emissions standards dovetailed with an energy bill passed that same
year in which both vehicle and gasoline producers needed to adapt their products
for reaching a low-carbon fuel standard that would require a 10-percent reduction
in carbon emissions from transportation fuels by 2020, as well as reaching the target
of a 5-percent annual average ethanol content in gasoline (Ministry of Environment,
2008: 40). In this same direction, the government developed a transportation pro-
gram called Move Ontario 2020, which included 902 kilometers of rail and light
transit for the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area, as well as expanding the sub-
way lines (Ministry of Environment, 2008).
Yet, the Go Green Plan left one of the main sources of energy in Ontario out of
the debate: nuclear energy. In 2009, the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) needed to
either rebuild or close the Pickering B and the Bruce B nuclear stations, both sched-
uled to come offline in 2013 (Burda and Peters, 2008: 7-8). The OPA had announced
that they would probably choose to refurbish them to continue nuclear electricity
generation. Civil society organizations like the Pembina Institute had been putting
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pressure on the McGuinty government to reverse the decision and reduce GHG emis-
sions by replacing both nuclear facilities with other green options such as hydro
(including electricity imported from U.S.), solar, and biomass (Burda and Peters,
2008: 2-10), start programs for co-generation (Pembina Institute, 2007a: 13), and
continue leading the nation in wind facilities.
However, through the Go Green Plan and the OPA, McGuinty’s government mod-
eled a scenario of 13-percent GHG reduction if both nuclear facilities were renewed soon
with more efficient technology (Government of Ontario, 2007). Ontario’s government
had tried to follow its constituency’s advice and began a reconversion to renewables,
through the Renewable Energy StandardOffer Program drafted in 2008. This program
meant spending money on subsidies for energy-efficient homes that use solar panels,
and for agriculture and agri-food biogas systems that convert organic waste into
methane to produce energy. It has also given incentives to the creation of green jobs,
attracting green investment, and developing research for clean technologies and in-
frastructure, especially in the area of bio-fuels (Ministry of Environment, 2008: 27-30).
One of the last actions of the Ontario government, taken by Minister of Envi-
ronment John Gerretsen, dealt with creating carbon sinks. In July 2008, it was
announced that Ontario would be protecting at least 225 000 km2 of the Far North
Boreal region to create a globally significant carbon sink. In addition, in the province’s
South region, the government launched a plan to plant 50 million trees by 2020
(Ministry of Environment, 2008). This approach can be interpreted in different ways
that could turn out to be complementary. First, it is possible that if the GHG-emissions
target is not reached as promised, and the incentives and voluntary mechanisms
cannot achieve a change in the province’s type of consumption-production activi-
ties, at least some of the CO2 could be captured by these sinks. On the other hand,
Ontario’s creation of sinks is also a strategy in several regional agreements in North
America to treat GHG emissions, through mechanisms like cap and trade systems in
local carbon markets.
TRANS-BIOECONOMIC REGIONS AND CAP AND TRADE MARKETS
The province of Ontario has participated in some of the newly developed regional
institutions for GHG reduction in North America. These regional schemes represent
a parallel route to the regionalism expressed in the North American Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). Like NAFTA, these regional pacts are formal in the sense that they
express binding commitments within a region. However, they are informal because
they are made up of sub-national governments, generally linked territorially. They
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are also informal in the sense that they are social constructs (Boas, Marchand and
Shaw, 2005) that incorporate different social sectors and specific policy objectives
beyond national frontiers. As a consequence, what defines these regions is the inte-
gration and coherence of their transnational economic activities (Clarkson, 2008;
Morales, 2008; Ramos, 2002) and their energy and environmental policies. In this
sense, these regions look like dynamic agreements intended to integrate four fac-
tors into policy design and outcomes.
The first factor deals with the integration and convergence of economic activi-
ties with environmental policies and strategies (Rowlands, 2008; Bernstein et al.,
2008), especially for climate change. The starting point of the region’s coherence and
integration can vary, but in general it is the energy sector that leads the intercon-
nectedness of economic integration, development, and climate change. The second
factor is expressed in the leading actors of this local energy integration. Sub-nation-
al governments in NorthAmerica have become the cornerstones of this kind of inte-
gration. These governments have created transnational “supra sub-national”
institutions that generally create binding commitments among the parties to them.
They run parallel –complimentary or contrary– to national policies or global instru-
ments, challenging the nation-state jurisdiction and United Nations strategies for
dealing with climate change.
The third factor refers to the incorporation of external environmental impacts
of other parties –“externalities”– into regional policy schemes to absorb their costs
and make policy adjustments. In this sense, these regions integrate sectoral policies
with climate-change goals transnationally, resulting in the sharing of externality
costs. The last factor deals with the preservation of the territory’s natural vocation
for conservancy and development (Toledo and Moguel, 1992), especially for ener-
gy production and use.
At this point, I will propose the concept of trans-bioeconomic regions to designate
these kinds of formal-informal regions composed and led by sub-national govern-
ments in North America. Trans-bioeconomic regions take into account the differ-
entiated responsibility for addressing the problem of climate change and energy
production/consumption. Although there can be regions within countries that share
these characteristics, it is my aim in this research to deal only with the ones with
transnational linkages. In North America, there are some initiatives that are trans-
bioeconomic regions. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Mid-western
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, the Western Climate Initiative, as well as dif-
ferent green conservation and economic corridors all include the participation of
different U.S. states, some Canadian provinces (Knigge and Bausch, 2006), and even
some of the northern Mexican cities and states.
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These North American trans-bioeconomic regions have used several mecha-
nisms and instruments, either developed within their own institutions or borrowed
from global climate-change governance agreements. Their main goal is to achieve
energy efficiency by integrating some policy sectors and adjusting their GHG-reduc-
tion commitments to their economic capabilities. For example, some regions use
common standards for developing green pricing systems, GHG inventories, climate
action plans, public energy funds, green taxes, or green portfolios where a mix of
types of energy are established over time (Knigge and Bausch, 2006). Some of them,
like taxes and portfolios, can become obligatory, but in general these instruments
are voluntary. However, one of the most popular is the cap and trade system. Cap
and trade is a voluntary, market-oriented mechanism for giving incentives to busi-
ness for managing or reducing GHG emissions. In this mechanism,
governments place a cap, or limit, on the total amount of emissions allowable, and then
require firms to account for their emissions by obtaining emission “allowances” for every
tonne of carbon dioxide they emit. Firms can obtain the allowances when the allowances
are first allocated and later by buying and/or trading allowances with other firms.
(Ministry of Environment, 2009a: 23)
The limits for capturing GHG emissions –which are the basis for the allowances–
are controlled by governments, so gradually allowances would becomemore scarce
and expensive, paying for technological reconversion. In the short term, pricing
carbon and capping industry and electricity would provide incentives for reducing
emissions and lowering costs, for example gaining efficiency or developing conser-
vation instruments. In the long term, it would help encourage the development and
adoption of transformative technology to meet deep reductions required by Ontar-
io’s longer-term targets (Ministry of Environment, 2009b). These “carbon markets”
are already in operation and connected to each other: the European Union Climate
Exchange (European Climate Exchange, 2009) and another in Chicago already exist
(Chicago Climate Exchange, 2009). In North America, there are several carbon-market
projects to develop climate exchange institutions: the newly inaugurated Montreal
Climate Exchange (Bourse de Montréal, 2009), others in California and New York,
and yet another in the northeast region, which includes some Canadian provinces
(Chicago Climate Exchange, 2009).
Some of the trans-bioeconomic regions in North America use this mechanism
for climate change cooperation. Cap and trade allows participants –in these cases,
sub-national governments, industries, and society– to adjust the type of instruments
used. One example is the fact that the province of Ontario has considered using a
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variation of the cap and trade model, where it would include offset credits along
with allowances. An offset credit is a credit created by non-capped emitters. Whereas
capped emitters are legally mandated to reduce their emissions by specific amounts,
non-capped emitters are companies or other GHG-emission sources that take volun-
tary action. Examples of voluntary actions are carbon sequestration activities, tree
planting, managing farmlands and forested areas, forest conservation, conservation
of wildlife habitat and protection of watersheds. These would have to reduce emis-
sions or sequester carbon in advance of, or along with, the development of emis-
sions trading programs (Pearson, 2008: 11-12).
The province of Ontario has participated in several of these regional initiatives
based on different elements. The first is Ontario’s economic and social integration,
“not with some amorphous mass called the United States of America, but, rather,
with particular American regions and states” (Van Nijnatten and Boychuk, 2006:
487), such as Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, New York, or Vermont.
Productive relations have an important role in the definition of the transnational
regional schemes in which Ontario participates. In order to integrate sectors such
as industry, energy, transport, and agri-food (Ministry of Environment, 2008: 25)
into the U.S. cross-border markets, the province had to incorporate environmental
standards negotiated within regional schemes by some of the neighboring U.S.
states. Second, this integration also means “vulnerability towards neighbors’ activ-
ities” (Clarkson, 2008: 134), such as pollution, environmental depletion, and GHG
emissions. This fact allows locating these problems and responses regionally and
territorially, especially in the area of the Great Lakes, one of the most polluted in
North America according to data from de Commission of Environmental Coopera-
tion for North America (2008a). The third factor to consider is the kind of conserva-
tion policy that exists in these areas and the geo-ecological vocation for developing
economic activities. In this sense, the Great Lakes area has both a pollution cluster
and weak environmental protection (Commission of Environmental Cooperation
for North America, 2008b) of the local ecosystems mainly composed of forests (Com-
mission of Environment Cooperation for North America, 2008c), one of the main
agents for capturing CO2 and lowering GHG emissions.
Based on these factors, Ontario has been incorporating them into its own GHG
reduction strategies and vice versa. We can track the province’s participation in the
trans-bioeconomic regional design at different territorial levels: in cooperation with
trans-boundary neighbors or with a wider scope, interacting with other sub-nation-
al initiatives in the North American region.
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TRANS-BIOECONOMIC REGIONS AND CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS
The Greenbelt Plan, originally launched in 2005, was intended to expand its scope
by 2008 to add protected countryside areas, especially headwaters, recharge areas,
and associated wetlands (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2009). The
plan and its expansion were based on the concept of a trans-bioeconomic region,
which integrated the natural heritage in the southeast of the province with the area’s
economic development, and with the lake shared by the province and other neigh-
boring provinces and states. In this area, conservation was needed to recover the
forest areas now transformed into growing grasslands. In addition, it contributed
to have a cleaner flow of water into Lake Ontario, shared with New York, which
became a source for GHG capture and contributed to stop deforestation (map 1 and
map 2).
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Source: Wikicommons
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ontario_GOLDEN_HORSESHOE.svg.
At the same time, this initiative recognized that economic activities and popu-
lation are concentrated in this area (Pembina Institute, 2007b: 3-16) and needed to
take into account the eco-systemic vocation for conservation. The initiative links the
Oak Ridges Moraine region and the Niagara Escarpment –both with conservation
plans– with the water system and a planned agricultural area to form the country-
side of the belt. It also identifies major valley corridors of rivers flowing from the
Oak Ridges Moraine and the Niagara Escarpment to provide natural linkage areas
from the Greenbelt to Lake Ontario, as well as identifying two specialty crop areas:
the Niagara Peninsula tender fruit and grape area and the Holland Marsh (Pembina
Institute, 2007b: 3-16).
In an umbrella approach in which legislation and planning must follow envi-
ronmental standards derived directly from the provincial government or regional
institutions, municipalities were required to make their official growth plans con-
form to the Greenbelt Growth Plan by June, 2009. In addition, municipalities need-
ed to take into account other provinces’ protection trends for their economic growth
goals (especially territorial expansion for demographic reasons). For example, there
are interprovincial programs with the province of Quebec, such as the Source
Protection Plans under the Clean Water Act (2006), or the expansion of the subway
line through the Metrolinx’s Regional Transportation Plan (Ministry of Municipal
Affairs and Housing, 2009).
As neighbors, Ontario and Quebec have also been developing cooperation mech-
anisms to cope with climate change and to deepen the economic integration with
neighboring U.S. states. In June 2008, Ontario signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing with Quebec to collaborate on a regional cap and trade system for GHGs (Min-
istry of Environment, 2008: 33). The strategy has gone further to integrate some
sectors like transportation and electricity through regional mechanisms, such as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) established in 2003. This initiative is a
cooperative effort by 10 northeastern and mid-Atlantic U.S. states jointly with some
Canadian provinces (Ontario, Quebec, Newfoundland, and the Atlantic Provinces)
to design a regional cap and trade system, setting the target of reducing GHG to 1990
levels by 2010 and reducing them 10 percent by 2020 (New England Governors/
Eastern Canadian Premiers, 2001), especially by electricity power plants in the region.
In the future, RGGI may also be extended to include other sources of GHG emissions
besides CO2 (Pearson, 2008: 10). In this sense, the Greenbelt Plan would serve as a
carbon sink for this region.
Ontario also joined as an observer the mid-western Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord signed on November 16, 2007, which currently includes seven mid-western
members (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Manitoba)
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and three more observers (Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota) (Mid-Western Gover-
nors Association, 2007). This accord was designed to cut GHG emissions and pro-
mote energy conservation through 1) a cap and trade system, 2) establishing GHG
reduction targets and timeframes, 3) setting low-carbon fuel standards, and 4) design-
ing regional incentives and funding mechanisms (Pearson, 2008: 10).
These different mechanisms try to link together some of the main elements of
the trans-bioeconomic region. Because of the members’ proximity and economic
integration, these initiatives have developed mechanisms that presuppose deepen-
ing integration in sectors such as electricity and transportation. They are looking
forward to harmonizing environmental standards and the creation of a green devel-
opment and business area. These regions tend to use mechanisms like cap and trade
systems or trans-sector policies. Although this region is the most appropriate for
this kind of green integration and could profit greatly from it, it is still the heart of
polluting, industrial North America. A change toward energy reconversion in busi-
nesses and industry here could create a precedent for green reconversion in other parts
of North America.
RELATIONS AMONG DIFFERENT TRANS-BIOECONOMIC
REGIONS IN NORTH AMERICA
In July 2008, Ontario joined the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) with the goal of
giving its industries the opportunity to participate in a broad carbon market that
helps them deliver real reductions at a lower cost (Western Climate Initiative, 2007;
Pearson, 2008: 10). Together with Quebec, British Columbia, Manitoba, and five other
U.S. Pacific Coast states, Ontario is helping develop this initiative, which has the goal
of reducing GHG emissions 15 percent by 2020 by establishing carbon trading sys-
tems no later than 2012. The mechanism is directed at integrating several sectors at
a time into the carbon market. Ontario’s plan is to start with electricity and industrial
sectors, followed bymanufacture and natural gas, and finally residential and commer-
cial natural gas, fuel oil, and transportation fuels by 2015 (Ministry of Environment,
2009b: 7-11; Western Climate Initiative, 2009). The WCI does not include the partici-
pation of Ontario’s U.S. neighboring states, thus affecting the integration of policies
that are indeed sketched in other initiatives. However, Ontario’s participation in this
initiative has enhanced cooperation mechanisms with RGGI (where U.S. states do parti-
cipate) and served as a link to western Canadian provinces with similar policy goals.
At a macro-regional level, in 2008, Ontario joined The Climate Registry to help
develop GHG standards for reporting and measuring GHG emissions in all cap and
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trade mechanisms in North America. This registry intends to work with other North
American provinces and states to develop and manage a common GHG-emissions
reporting system that measures, tracks, verifies, and publicly reports emissions across
borders and industries (The Climate Registry, 2009; Pearson, 2008: 10). This registry
is made up of all Canadian provinces, the Yukon and North West Territories, 40 U.S.
states, and Mexico’s six border states. The Climate Registry is based on the Kyoto
Protocol’s registry-report system. In this case, the trans-bioeconomic region expands
its scope and harmonizes measurement systems to almost all of North America
(The Climate Registry, 2009). In this sense, the trans-bioeconomic region is knowl-
edge-oriented and geographically located.
As a summary of this section, we can note that different regional efforts have
linked provinces and states in different kinds of initiatives. Their formal-informal
integration, besides being regional, has intended to focus on sectors. This approach
has resulted in the drafting of comprehensive policies for climate change within dif-
ferent levels of authority that take into account the impact and capabilities of the
local economies.
CONCLUSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITS
Given the legal ambiguities in jurisdiction or competencies and the slow negotiations
that the Canadian federal government carried out for climate policy (Howlett, 2000:
533), it is understandable that provinces were forced to create alternative institu-
tional mechanisms locally to deal with the impacts of climate change. This article has
presented these new routes and strategies that the province of Ontario has followed
regarding to GHG-emission reductions in the NorthAmerican context. The integration
of policies into new forms of conceiving the region is what seems to be happening
among Canadian provinces, U.S. states, and even some Mexican ones. The driving
force for this integration has been climate change, but only if related to local govern-
ments’ energy-efficiency goals. The main instruments for Canadian provinces have
been voluntary market mechanisms, avoiding, in this sense, the establishment of
compulsory commitments and specific obligatory targets. For example, Ontario has
been avoiding instruments like carbon taxes or portfolios, in contrast with some of
the U.S. states. Nonetheless, Ontario, Canada’s second most polluting province, has
been taking action to cope with climate change and to keep upwith economic growth.
The province’s strongest initiatives are those drafted with neighboring provinces.
Ontario’s government climate strategy dovetails with several initiatives that
follow all elements of the concept of trans-bioeconomic region. However, trans-
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bioeconomic regions have challenges and limits. The first is that the amount of GHG
reduction that each will contribute has no major effect on a global scale. However,
these initiatives “could contribute importantly to moving forward the overall poli-
tics of greenhouse gas regulation” (Engel, 2006: 56). The second is depending on
cap and trade mechanisms for achieving goals. This instrument presents challenges
in the context of North America’s initiatives on climate change. It is possible that
emissions regulations may be duplicated where there is participation in more than
one market or where the federal government implements a new cap and trade sys-
tem on a continental basis. The Climate Registry would be the priority as the leader
of the cap and trade information system to avoid this situation. In addition, these
regional mechanisms will need to avoid overlapping and find a way to coexist
within national and international frameworks.
Until December 2008, Canada’s prime minister and the U.S. president had not
talked about integration mechanisms for dealing with climate change. In January
2009, the issue was put on the North American agenda thanks to a bilateral pro-
posal to launch a North American cap and trade system. This proposal was drafted
during a visit of President Obama to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Prime Minis-
terHarper pointed out the need to create a continental cap and trade system thatwould
include, at first, the three NAFTA countries (Economist.com, 2009). For President
Obama, this idea would be an important mechanism for technological conversion
and lower external dependency on fossil fuels. This position was supported by the
U.S. economic recovery bill signed on February 19, 2009, which stipulated that
Obama’s government would grant over US$76.53 billion for renewable energy,
energy efficiency, and development of green technology. The Canadian government
also put money into the issue, but only Can$1.60 billion (Weiss and Bramley, 2009:
1-2). Canada’s prime minister has been forced to follow the green trends of his
southern neighbor to try to match up the two countries’ environmental rules and
standards to keep economic relations going. This has made the government of
Alberta unhappy: besides having to deal with fluctuating oil prices, it has been forced
to create a climate action plan and support Canadian courts in punishing high con-
taminating oil companies (Economist.com, 2009). Once again the Canadian federal
government has to deal with two fronts: the green provinces and Alberta.
Another challenge for the regional “supra-subnational” institutions in North
America, where Ontario participates, is being able to adapt to a changing context.
In June, 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey
Initiative) was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives. This national bill sets
the target of generating 25 percent of electricity using wind, solar and geothermal
energy, and biomass by 2050. It also includes a proposal for a cap and trade North
American market and mechanisms for carbon capture and sequestration (Pew
Center, 2009). Although some U.S. states, like California, have declared that if this
bill becomes law they will enforce it, others have said that the targets are too high
(Gardner and Henderson, 2009). This would pose a serious issue for trans-bioeco-
nomic regions in that they would have to adapt their already functioning schemes
to the new policy and probably reconfigure the region’s frontier. Nonetheless, this
bill is still in the U.S. Senate and is expected to be discussed just after the December
2009 Copenhagen meeting of the Kyoto Protocol process.
Although Ontario has been preparing for these challenges through enforcing the
law, industry incentives, and regional market mechanisms, Environmental Commis-
sioner for Ontario Gord Miller pointed out that the stability and small growth of the
province’s GHG emissions reported in 2008 “might be attributable to a decline in
economic activity, rather than the success of government initiatives. It will be impor-
tant for the government to clarify the extent to which these reductions are permanent
or only transitory” (Miller, 2008). Perhaps the new Green EnergyAct, drafted by the
Ontario government February 23, 2009, can reinforce the efforts the province has been
developing (Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, 2009). This bill was the result of
pressure from the Ontario Sustainable Energy Association, together with other leading
trade associations, environmental groups, First Nations, developers, manufacturers,
farmers, and landowners (Ontario Sustainable EnergyAssociation, 2009). Mark Lutes,
the David Suzuki Foundation’s climate change and energy policy analyst, notes that
“with this initiative, Ontario is on track to become a leader in the global shift to
clean energy and in preventing dangerous climate change” (Lutes, 2009). He added
that this strategy would engender the right conditions for attracting investment for
manufacturing and research in green energy and create about 50 000 new jobs dur-
ing the next three years. This could allow Ontario’s industry to continue supplying
goods and services to the North American partners (Lutes, 2009).
When the U.S. and Canadian economies completely recover from the financial
crisis, when demand for Ontarian products starts flowing again, and when today’s
uncertain oil prices stabilize, we will know for sure if Ontario was on the right path.
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